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CORPORATE BEHAVIOR AND THE TAx CUTS AND JOBS ACT
by Nicholas H. Cohen and Manoj Viswanathan
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (the "TCJA") fundamentally altered United
States tax law. Among other things, it broadly decreased income tax rates paid by
individuals and corporations, eliminated miscellaneous itemized deductions, limited
the state and local tax deduction, increased the standard deduction, reduced the
alternative minimum tax for individuals and eliminated it entirely for corporations,
and allowed a deduction for certain pass-through business income.
TCJA proponents, generally Republicans, claimed that its $1.5 trillion of tax cuts
would result in significant economic benefits. In particular, TCJA supporters
believed that the tax benefits afforded U.S. corporations,J most notably the
reduction in rate from 35 percent to 21 percent, would incentivize corporations to
use their additional after-tax cash in ways generally beneficial to the U.S. economy.
Predicted indicia of these salutary effects included increases in the rate growth of
gross domestic product, increased national capital stock, and significant increases to
workers' wages. TCJA opponents instead expected its benefits to inure almost
entirely to a small group of investors and corporate managers. Many critics
(generally Democrats and deficit hawks) considered the TCJA a distributionally
unsound way to allocate such a significant tax cut.
Corporations have operated for nearly two years under this new corporate tax
regime. Their most recent annual corporate filings provide information from the
first full calendar year in which the TCJA's provisions are in full effect. These
reports contain information on effective tax rate, capital expenditures, CEO
compensation, and other important metrics of corporate activity and productivity.
From this data we can analyze the preliminary effects the TCJA has had on these
corporations and assess the extent to which claims made by the TCJA's proponents
on corporate behavior have been borne out. While other studies have considered the
TCJA's effect on specific corporate attributes, this Essay is the first to assess the
TCJA's effect on a range of corporate behaviors by using recently filed, publicly
available data on a granular, corporation-by-corporation basis.
Specifically, our study assesses the extent to which changes in effective tax rates for
the top cohort of companies in the Standard & Poor's 500 index (S&P 500) relate to
a variety of corporate behaviors purportedly affected by the TCJA.[21 Our results
indicate that the TCJA's reduction in effective tax rate had zero relationship to
number of employees; dividends paid; capital expenditures; cash flow from
operations; market value; capital expenditure ratio; research and development
ratio; earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT); earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA); and total executive compensation. Our
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study indicates that the TCJA's reduction in effective tax rate has a small
relationship to CEO compensation and total value of shares repurchased. Although
the effects (or non-effects) of the TCJA may not be known for years, our study
indicates that the anticipated economic benefits of the TCJA due to its changes to
effective corporate tax rate have yet to be observed. Indeed, the reduced effective
corporate tax rates might promote certain less desirable corporate behaviors, such
as increased CEO compensation and increased numbers of stock shares
repurchased.
This Essay proceeds in four parts. Part I describes how the TCJA modified the
corporate income tax code and details the purported economic benefits of the TCJA,
focusing on claims that were made just prior to the TCJA's passage. Part II
describes our study's methodology, presents our statistical results, and discusses
limitations to our analysis. Part III discusses the implications of our study on the
economics of corporate tax rates. The Appendix includes a full description of our
methodology.
I. TCJA Changes to Corporate Taxation and Predicted Economic Effects
The TCJA made many important changes to U.S. corporate income tax law. Most
fundamentally, the TCJA reduced the statutory rate on all corporate income to a
flat 21 percent from a previous top marginal rate of 35 percent. Beyond reducing the
statutory rate, the TCJA also affected several other provisions relevant for
corporations, including those concerning earnings stripping, expensing and
depreciating, net operating losses, and the taxation of foeign subsidiaries.L3J In
addition, it created a global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI) regime41 and the
foreign-derived intangible income (FDII) deduction.JM
These TCJA provisions influence corporations in various ways. The specific
operations of a particular business affect the tax benefits (or penalties) to which the
business might be subjected. A corporation with little foreign operations, for
instance, will have little use for the FDII deduction. In the aggregate, however, the
TCJA is unequivocally corporation-friendly: it generally reduces the taxes paid by
corporations despite an increase in corporate profits. This reduction in corporate tax
liability was marketed by TCJA supporters as a necessary stimulus for the U.S.
economy.
TCJA proponents expected that corporations paying lower taxes would have greater
access to cash flows. These cash flows could be deployed to invest in capital
expenditures, such as research, development, and upgraded plants and equipment.
These investments would result in a boom of productivity, increasing the marginal
value created by each employee. This, in turn, would cause increased hiring of new
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employees and increased compensation for existing employees. Proponents also
expected that corporations would take advantage of decreased repatriation taxes to
"onshore" cash previously held in foreign subsidiaries; this would create beneficial
effects similar to the decreased corporate income tax rate.
Proponents also expected that investor behavior would change in ways that were
beneficial to the general economy. The assumption inherent in this view is that
investors have a largely constant expectation of after-tax returns on deployed
capital for a given level of risk asset. Decreasing the corporate tax rate would,
therefore, increase the supply of capital, as more investment opportunities would
offer the desired after-tax return on investment. Similar to the actions of
corporations, this would result in increased capital expenditures, eventually
increasing employment levels and average incomes via the same path.
Trump administration officials and other prominent Republicans frequently
reiterated these purported economic benefits of the TCJA. Senate Majority Leader
Mitch McConnell predicted that the economic growth catalyzed by the tax cuts
would result in the bill's revenue neutrality. Former House Speaker Paul Ryan
stated that the corporate tax cuts would lead directly to the creation of new jobs,
and not to corporations redistributing the newfound cash to shareholders. Kevin
Hassett, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, claimed that the reduced
corporate income rate and expanded expensing provisions would promote higher
wages to workers and increased capital expenditures. And last but not least,
President Donald Trump promised that the TCJA would result in more American
jobs, bigger paychecks for workers, repatriation of trillions of dollars of corporate
cash, a rocket-fueled economy, and a one-page tax filing for the vast majority of
taxpayers.
II. Effect of Tax Rate Reductions on Corporate Behaviors
Our analysis considers the natural experiment engendered by the passage of the
TCJA. It compares the change in effective tax rate and its relationship on
measurable corporate behavior as reported in the first set of post-TCJA 10-K filings.
(The Securities and Exchange Commission requires all corporations with publicly
offered equity, as well as corporations meeting other criteria, to file 10-K forms each
year.) The complexity of corporate tax laws ensures a dramatic diverggnce between
the statutory corporate tax rate of 21 percent and effective corporate tax rates,
where effective rate is defined as total worldwide taxes divided by total worldwide
earnings. Some of these divergences are related to identifiable corporate features
(such as industry group), but others are unique to a corporation's specific tax
situation. This tax rate divergence ensures that corporations have experienced
vastly different consequences from the TCJA. Companies already paying little tax,
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for example, would see almost no rate reduction from the TCJA. In contrast,
corporations paying the maximum pre-TCJA statutory rate of 35 percent are nearly
guaranteed to see large reductions in effective tax rate. Proponents of the TCJA
would expect these more affected corporations to take the actions described
previously, thereby creating positive externalities for the U.S. economy.
Corporations with little reduction in effective tax rate would not be expected to
change their actions. If these actions are a function of their respective corporations'
change in tax rate, this would indicate the TCJA is affecting corporate behaviors.
We considered the one hundred companies with the largest weightings in the S&P
500, excluding financial companies, as well as certain firms that had not published
2018 annual results at the time of the study. We also excluded outlier companies
with an unusually large relative tax benefit, with a tax rate greater than 75
percent, or with an absolute value of change in deferred income tax of at least $15
billion between 2017 and 2018. This left ninety-one companies within our study.
To represent the period before the passage of the TCJA, we considered both the
change in effective tax rate from 2017 alone, as well as the change in effective tax
rate using an average from years 2015, 2016, and 2017 as the base year. These
relative changes in effective tax rate were then compared to several dependent
variables to determine the effect, if any, on corporate behavior. The twelve
dependent variables against which the change in effective tax rate were tested are
(1) number of employees; (2) dividends paid; (3) capital expenditures; (4) cash flow
from operations; (5) market value; (6) capital expenditure ratio; (7) research and
development ratio; (8) EBIT; (9) EBITDA; (10) total executive compensation;
(11) CEO compensation; and (12) total value of shares repurchased. We used three
control variables in the study: corporate market capitalization, number of
employees, and tax rate.
As expected, the effective income tax rate decreased significantly within our group
of corporations. Using the single year base of 2017, the mean and median decrease
in effective tax rate was 5.8 percent and 4.5 percent, respectively, with 71 of 91
companies reporting a decrease in effective tax rate. Using the multi-year base of
years 2015-2017, the mean and median decrease was even larger, 9.8 percent and
8.0 percent, respectively, with 72 of 91 companies experiencing a relative decrease
in tax rate. The summary statistics for the corporate behaviors studied are
contained in Tables 1 and 2 of the Appendix.
Our analysis revealed that few corporate behaviors were affected by change in
effective tax rate to a statistically significant degree. This includes two specific
corporate behaviors, number of employees and capital expenditure ratio, which
TCJA proponents indicated would change due to decreased corporate tax rates. The
only dependent variables showing any statistical significance are CEO
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compensation, using the single base year of 2017, and total value of shares
repurchased, using the 2015-2017 average. This implies that the decrease in
effective corporate tax rate bears some relationship-though likely not a causal
relationship-to both increased CEO compensation and total value of shares
repurchased.
While our study has shown no evidence of widespread benefits of any kind resulting
changes in corporate behaviors due to changes in effective corporate tax rates, there
are limitations to our analysis. We focused on only the largest, publicly-listed U.S.
corporate entities. It is possible that smaller companies or private companies might
behave differently than the corporations in our sample set. In addition, as this
study was intended as a survey, we did not analyze sub-samples, such as industry
type; as such, there may be ways to further parse the data that could return
different results. Also, our study considers only one year after the passage of the
TCJA, which may be too brief of a period for corporations to take action due to
decreased tax rates. Finally, different corporations could make accounting decisions
that render comparisons of the type included here imperfect; it is possible that
different methods of managing data would produce different conclusions.
III. Rationales for Corporate Behaviors (and Non-Behaviors)
Our analysis indicates that post-TCJA corporate behavior accords little with what
TCJA proponents predicted. The reasons for this lack of observed corporate
behavior due to changes in effective tax rate are far from clear, but potential
explanations can be posited.
Even before its passage, opponents of the legislation expressed strong reasons to
believe that corporations would do little with their tax savings other than returning
it to investors in the form of stock buybacks or overcompensating management.
Corporations have many sources of cash other than after-tax earnings. Total
checkable deposits and currency on non-financial corporate balance sheets as of the
first quarter of 2019 total approximately $926 billion. In addition, as of February
2020, highly rated "AA" companies could borrow funds at an effective interest rate
of approximately 2.1 _ercent; even corporations that borrow in the higher-yielding
"junk bond market" (rating "BB") had an approximate average interest rate of only
3.7 percent. If corporations already have vast access to cash reserves that they were
not investing, the relatively smaller, additional cash flow from tax savings is
unlikely to be significantly invested in company operations.
There was historical Drecedent that the repatriation holiday would produce little
benefit. A similar measure was attempted through the American Jobs Creation Act
(AJCA) of 2004; but few corporations took advantage of the provision at the time.
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The ACJA also created a perverse, long-term disincentive for corporations to
repatriate future earnings due to expectations of future one-time tax cuts, which
was one reason why corporate assets in extraterritorial subsidiaries had greatly
increased in the interim. The similarity between the repatriation provisions of the
AJCA and the TCJA could be expected to produce similar results.
Other theories could explain why TCJA provisions affecting investor tax liabilities
would not positively affect the economy via increased worker wages or increased
capital expenditures. Macroeconomics dictates that, in an economy closed to foreign
investment, savings must equal investment. By virtue of this "savings identity," for
total invested capital to increase in an economy, the savings rate must increase. The
likely source for this increase is decreased consumption. However, this decreased
consumption diminishes economic output, offsetting the benefits of increased
investment. In the medium term, efficiency gains resulting from investment could
outweigh the short-term drag caused by this decreased consumption. However, in
the first eighteen months after its passage, the increased capital expenditures
included in rosy projections of the TCJA's effects have not materialized.
The savings identity argument against the TCJA could, potentially, be mitigated by
the fact that the United States is not a closed economy. Capital can travel almost
freely into the United States from many other countries. It is possible that the
newly decreased corporate tax rate would result in greatly increased foreign
investment in the United States, creating productivity gains without domestic
consumption loss. However, if the equilibrium level of after-tax return on
investment is roughly fixed (an assumption of TCJA proponents, as discussed
above), then cross-border investment opportunities are correspondingly limited. Our
analysis reveals no evidence of an increase in net foreign capital flows since the
passage of the TCJA.
Conclusion
Despite a decline in effective tax rate that is, on average, approximately five percent
from the year preceding the TCJA, and ten percent from years 2015-2017, there are
few indicia of the corporate-investment-led economic boom predicted by Trump
administration officials. While it is difficult to definitively know why corporations
have not significantly reinvested their tax savings in their employees, property,
plants, or equipment, we have identified economic theories that predict such a lack
of activity. Should further studies find similar results, they will support theories
predicting that the incidence of corporate taxation falls mainly upon investors (as
opposed to employees or customers), and that investor behavior is largely inelastic
with respect to moderate changes in tax rates.
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The TCJA cut taxes by $1.5 trillion and in the process conferred significant tax
benefits on U.S. corporations. Unlike the predictions of the TCJA's proponents,
economic growth has shown no sign of increasing nearly to the extent necessary for
the tax cut to pay for itself. In addition to increases in discretionary spending
passed shortly after the TCJA, the United States now faces the largest federal
budget deficit it has ever experienced during a period of peace and economic growth.
While the long-term impacts of fiscal profligacy are as uncertain as the tax policy
effects on economic growth, we should expect that such a sizable reduction in
federal tax revenue comes with some economic benefits to offset the burden of
increased debt. Based on our study, we have not found any such benefits in the post-
TCJA behavior of U.S. corporations.
Nicholas Cohen is the Founder and Principal of LobbySeven LLC, where he
regularly publishes on fiscal policy through a quantitative lens. Manoi Viswanathan
is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of California, Hastings College of
the Law. Thanks to A rita Sethi for outstanding research assistance.
Footnotes
fjl1 Although the TCJA did affect the taxation of S-corporations, this Essay focuses
on C-corporations. Thus, all references to "corporations," unless otherwise specified,
are to C-corporations.
J Our measure of "effective tax rate" is not the GAAP effective tax rate reported in
corporate filings. See Aipendix (describing methodology for calculating effective tax
rate).
J3 The TCJA permits a U.S. corporation that owns at least 10 percent of certain
foreign corporations to deduct an amount equal to the foreign-source portion of any
dividend received from the foreign corporation, in essence creating a modified
territorial system of taxation.
J4 The GILTI regime imposes a minimum tax rate on foreign income, inducing U.S.
corporations to keep income-generating intellectual property in the United States.
J5 FDII is income greater than some fixed return on a corporation's depreciable,
tangible return, and is subject to a lower tax rate.
